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The Digital Entertainment Industries and Beyond; Verso
*
 
Paul Thompson, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow 
Rachel Parker and Stephen Cox, Queensland University of Technology 
The chapter draws on research that situates development studios ± games and visual effects (VFX) ± 
in the global value chain, concerned with issues of control and value capture faced by small and 
medium-sized producers of digital entertainment products. In the context of the relevant industries, it 
shows how mainstream global value chain (GVC) perspectives are unable to deal with asymmetric 
power relations between capitals and between capital and labour. A preliminary model of value and 
power dynamics is developed that goes beyond complexity of information exchange, codifiability and 
competence of the supplier base (cf. Gereffi et al., 2005), in part by incorporating labour power ± 
value inputs, agency and impacts ± more fully into the framework. The chapter is, therefore, a 
contribution both to developing less workplace-centric versions of labour process theory and 
exploring it compatibility with value chain models that have a more radical intent restored. 
Problems and Problematics 
Locating and explaining the dynamics of work relations at workplace level has become progressively 
more challenging as intra- and inter-organizational relations have become more complex, employment 
systems more fragmented and business environments subject to continual restructuring within national 
and global contexts. The need for revised conceptual frameworks has also been driven by recognition 
of the limits of single, workplace or company case studies and the need for multi-case, multi-levelled 
approaches. It is within such problematics that the particular challenge for labour process theory 
(LPT) can be situated. Though mainstream LPT has always been framed in terms of the causal 
pathways between capitalist political economy (CPE) and work/employment relations, it has often 
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lacked the meso-level research tools needed to bridge the gap. Despite favouring industry-level 
analysis, the links have tended to be made in terms of generic features of capitalism, national varieties 
or modes of accumulation such as Fordism and post-Fordism.  
As this volume reflects, there are a number of options available for making such connections along a 
GVC-global production network (GPN) spectrum. Building on a small amount of existing research 
following a similar path (e.g. Flecker and Meil, 2010; Flecker et al., 2013), this chapter opts to 
explore the extent to which a modified GVC framework is the most appropriate direction. The 
growing prominence and popularity of GVC analysis has led to some critiques, friendly and 
otherwise. Some, particularly those influenced by radical economic geography, have focused on the 
development of an alternative GPN perspective (Coe et al., 2008; Cumbers et al., 2008). Objections to 
GVC focus on the preference of that perspective for the linear governance structures of lead firms. In 
contrast, GPN approaches have a much broader scope, with multi-level analyses that examine more 
fluid networks of power, complex interactions between actors in the creation of value and intra-firm 
and non-firm actors such as functional groups, labour, consumers and non-governmental 
organizations. Many of these points are accurate and pertinent. The point with respect to labour is of 
particular importance for this book. Though there is some recognition that the availability of types of 
labour (cheaper, more mobile, more skilled) might affect contractual or other aspects of exchange, it 
is now widely acknowledged that the GVC mainstream neglects labour as a source and/or target of 
GVC dynamics (see for example, Newsome et al., 2013). 
Despite all these criticisms, the essential rationale for exploring the potential for GVC frameworks is 
precisely their more parsimonious character. LPT needs expanded tools to address more complex 
industry structures, particularly within globalizing contexts. GPN critiques of GVC frameworks have 
focused particularly on that parsimony. Yet, Selwyn (2011: 2) is, in our view, rightly sceptical of 
DWWHPSWV WR µLQFRUSRUDWH DOO WKH UHOHYDQW DFWRUV UHODWLRQVKLSV DQG QHWZRUN FRQILJXUDWLRQV¶ LQ D
meaningful way in a single framework. For all its imperfections, GVC has offered a theory-building 
project that can, in principle, link issues of power and value capture to inter-firm dynamics and 
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industry restructuring. There is a danger that LPT would swap a workplace-FHQWULFIRFXVIRUDµWKHRU\
RIHYHU\WKLQJ¶ 
Having set out our general intent, the rest of this chapter unfolds as follows. We begin by exploring 
the expanding emergent commentaries and critiques of the dominant governance model, with the 
objective of developing a post-GVC model that can address some of the main concerns. The question 
of labour ± the main concern of this volume ± is a wider one than governance. We review existing 
attempts to insert and integrate labour, largely from a GPN perspective, before again setting out some 
alternatives. Finally, we seek to apply that new approach to labour to the digital entertainment 
industries. We show that while Australian games development firms are participating to a greater 
extent in global markets, the power asymmetries along the value chain have resulted in a situation in 
which they are at a severe disadvantage, with largely negative consequences for labour. 
What GVC DRHVQ¶WExplain or Explain Well Enough 
The governance structure taxonomy developed by Gereffi et al. (2005) has facilitated a significant 
growth in research and theory building. As is well known, their theory of GVC governance rests on 
WKHµWKUHH&V¶ complexity of information exchange, codifiability of that information/knowledge and 
competence/capacity of the suppliers. Whilst all these questions are legitimate, particularly with 
respect to issues of upgrading (of companies and countries), they lead to a focus on particular linear 
and dyadic transactions. Power and value are then filtered through a narrow(er) lens. As Gibbon et al. 
(2008: 323) noteµWKH theory of GVC governance suggests that power is a contingent property of only 
certain types of inter-fLUP FRRUGLQDWLRQ¶. A firm-level dyadic focus is thus unable or less likely to 
µVHH¶DQGH[plain broader changes in the political economy, for example concentration of capital or 
financialization (Milburg, 2008; Palpaceur, 2008). 
<IP>Recent papers from scholars with at least one foot inside the GVC tent have identified some of 
WKHXQGHUO\LQJUHDVRQVIRUD µSURJUHVVLYHQDUURZLQJ¶RIJRYHUQDQFHDQGFKDLQFRQVtructs from their 
inception in World Systems and Global Commodity Chain (GCC) frameworks (Gibbon et al. 2008; 
Bair, 2009). The latter focuses on the LQIOXHQFH RI µQHWZRUN HSLVWHPRORJLHV¶ SDUWLFXODUO\ WKRVH
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deriving from embeddedness arguments, originally associated with Granovetter (1985). Without 
sketching the detail or trajectory, it can be observed that this was premised more on interpersonal 
relations between actors and on trust as a mechanism of coordination. This kind of analysis was 
transferred or transposed to inter-firm coordination and networks were presented as a governance 
form in their own right, distinct from markets and hierarchies. 6XFKDQDO\VHVWHQGHGWRµSULYLOHJHWKH
ORFDO¶ 
« because these are the contexts in which we can see at work the social structure that is at the 
explanatory core of the embeddedness paradigm ± that is, networks of interpersonal relations. 
This micro-sociological conception of how social structure shapes economic outcomes 
produces what Hess (2004) calls an over-territorialized conception of embeddedness that 
neglects the multi-scalar dynamics of the global economy and the international dimension of 
contemporary economic organization. (Bair, 2008: 347) 
However, a narrowing of the GVC frame is, arguably, more directly influenced by the importing of 
transaction cost economics than the embeddedness paradigm. In what Gibbon et al. (2008) dub the 
µFRRUGLQDWLRQ WXUQ¶ WKH IRFXV RI *9& LV QDUURZHG WR LQWHU-firm coordination and bilateral 
dependencies focusing on asset specificity ± the core idea underlying the 3Cs. In previous frameworks 
such as global commodity chain (GCC), transaction costs had been only one factor affecting the 
organizational and spatial configuration of chains (Bair, 2008: 347). The 3Cs are important, but taken 
in isolation, or more precisely only or primarily in terms of dyadic interactions, they can be limited or 
misleading. Taken together, network epistemologies and the 3CVQDUURZWKHIUDPHµDt the cost of a 
broader conceptualization of governance dynamics across the chain¶ (Bair, 2008: 353). Power 
becomes reduced to coordinative capacity, and key dimensions of the political economy are side-
lined.  
What of value?  
The trend toward a re-configuration of GVC analysis in terms of mainstream economics or some 
version of economic sociology has had the apparent side ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽĨ ŵŽǀŝŶŐ ƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐ ? ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ
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ĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽĨ ?ǀĂůƵĞ ? ?ĂƚŽƉŝĐƚŚĂƚĂŶŝŶŶŽĐĞŶƚŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌŵŝŐŚƚĂƐƐƵŵĞƐŚŽƵůĚůŝĞĂƚƚŚĞ
heart of theories of global value chains). (Gibbon et al., 2008: 331) 
These authors argue that the question of value has two components: how value is created and how it is 
distributed. The first has been increasingly ignored, while the latter is largely untheorized, but 
implicitly or explicitly focuses on shares of final prices captured by actors at different links in 
particular chains. We can argue about how value is created and calculated, but again the main need is 
surely to move to a broader understanding of the conditions under which value capture takes place. 
This requires an emphasis on putting capital back in the picture. In the recent period this has tended to 
fall to researchers focusing on the significance of financialization. A metaphor used by Gibbon et al. 
(2008) is governance as driving, but who or what is doing it? In the past, lead firm type has 
distinguished between buyer- (commercial capital) and producer-driven (industrial capital) chains. 
Whilst a focus on circuits of capital is useful, capital markets have become more important to the 
picture in the contemporary political economy (Thompson, 2013).  
In an overview of macro-economic conditions leading to financialization in global chains, Milburg 
REVHUYHV WKDW µexternalization has developed from the logic of vertically integrated markets, with 
continued competition among suppliers, offloading of risk and increased focus on core competence; 
all aimed at raising shareKROGHU YDOXH¶ 8: 434). Palpacuer reinforces that view, arguing that 
pressures on suppliers from global buyers are no longer stemming only from competitive dynamics in 
product markets, but from the financialization of lead firms, DQG WKDW µLQWHQVLILFDWLon in corporate 
reporting to financial markets induced a more stringent monitoring oIVXSSOLHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHEDVHG
on formal systems of supplier relation management¶ (2008: 399). Financialization is only one, albeit 
significant, dimension of the need to focus on how actually existing capital shapes and constrains 
inter-firm relations at points in the chain. This process will be explored further with respect to digital 
entertainment industries later in the chapter. 
Beyond (More) Missing Links ± a Post-GVC Framework?  
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<UIP>We began this chapter by referring to the omission or marginalization of labour in GVC and 
related frameworks. Bair (2008: 347) argues that it is necessary to go back to World Systems Theory 
to find a focus on labour in and beyond transaction costs. The immediate predecessor of the GVC 
theory, GCC analysis, was framed in terms of upgrading within the international division of labour 
and studies tended to deal only indirectly with the impact on labour from buyer-driven commodity 
chains. The problem is that in a focus on upgrading or dyadic inter-firm relations, the experiences and 
interests of labour tend to be subsumed within consideration of the supplier position (Palpaceur, 2008: 
402).. 
As we shall see in the following section, the neglect of labour has been partly rectified, at least in 
broader GPN literatures. Picking up on this point however, Smith (2014:  DUJXHV WKDW µWKH VDPH
FDQQRW EH VDLG IRU DQDO\VHV RI WKH VWDWH¶ +H DFFHSWV WKDW WKHUH KDV EHHQ VRPH recognition of 
institutional and regulatory frameworks that add the state as an actor, particularly in promoting or 
constraining upgrading. However, Smith persuasively argues that it is not enough to consider the state 
DV SDUW RI WKH FRQWH[W IRU WKLV µKDs not provided a framework for understanding the articulation 
between state regulation, production networks and the wider accumulation strategies of which they 
are a part¶ (2014: 2). 
Where do all these missing links and misconceptualizations leave us? In the two papers from Gibbon 
et al (2008) and Bair (2008) that we have drawn from, the answer sometimes seems to be a preference 
for returning to some kind of GCC analysis, or scaling down the by now ubiquitous governance 
categories/typology of Gereffi et al. (2005) to DµPHWKRGRORJ\¶ WKDWFDQEHHQDFWHGZLWKLQGLIIHUHQW
theoretical perspectives. However, it is not entirely clear what GVC as methodology option entails, 
and a danger would be that it evades questions about what would enable GVC categories to support 
better explanation. The diagram below sketches the outlines of an alternative. It seeks to elaborate a 
ELJJHU µFKDLQ¶ SLFWXUH ZLWKRXW IDOOLng into a multi-factor µtheory of everything¶. Furthermore, it is 
broadly consistent with Gibbon et al.¶V8: 333) call for moving away from viewing governance 
simply DV D FRPELQDWLRQ RI VSHFLILF µFRRUGLQDWLRQ¶ LVVXHV EHWZHHQ ILUPV, and towards viewing 
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governance more in the context of other factors such as firm size, market share and external 
regulatory environments. 
Figure 3.1 A post-GVC framework 
A post-GVC framework?
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In identifying issues concerning capital, labour and the state, the aim is to IRFXVRQSULRUµGULYLQJ¶
questions that help to locate or frame inter-firm relations across the whole chain, irrespective of what 
the concrete empirical focus is within particular parts. So, for example, what is the extent and 
character of market concentration; how financialized are the lead firms; and is there identifiable 
strategic coupling between lead firms and state actors? In particular, it is important to restore some of 
the earlier emphasis on lead firms DQGWKHLUµH[WHUQDO¶UHODWLRQV, JLYHQWKDWWKHµlead firms have 
continued to dictate the terms and conditions of participation in networks and chains through different 
W\SHVRIJRYHUQDQFHWKDWDFWXSRQSDUWLFLSDQWV³DWDGLVWDQFH´¶1HLOVRQ et al., 2014: 2). Four further 
points need to be made concerning this mapping. First, there is no intent to present or develop a 
totalizing model along the lines of regulation theory, in which integrated structures all function to 
reproduce capitalism. Domains should be treated as distinctive entities with various degrees of 
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connection and disconnection (see Thompson, 2013). Second, though these entities have their own 
trajectories, they are overlapping and part of the challenge is to SURYLGHIRUH[DPSOHµDIUDPHZRUN
for understanding the articulation between state regulation, production networks and the wider 
accumulation strategiHVRIZKLFKWKH\DUHDSDUW¶6PLWK, 2014: 2). Fifth, the value-power line is there 
simply to indicate that the interplay of material and symbolic power resources and value capture takes 
SODFHLQWKHVSKHUHVEHWZHHQDQGZLWKLQWKHPDFURUHJLPHDQGµORFDOLzHG¶QHWZRUNJRYHUQDQFH
dynamics. 
Part of the process that links domains together is the enhanced role of intermediaries such as 
consultants, labour market agencies and standard-setters (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011; Neilson et al. 
2014). As the latter note, µThese firm and non-firm intermediaries not only bridge and connect 
different value chains and production networks, but also offer other unique inputs, mostly intangible 
in nature, to make thosHQHWZRUNVZRUN¶ 2). Third, capital, labour and the state are neither 
simply context nor background noise that can be bracketed out or RQO\FRQVLGHUHGLIWKHµILUVWFXW¶
does not find the predicted governance patterns (Sturgeon in Bair, 2009: 357). These domains are 
always implicated in chain dynamics, though in different ways and to different extents. Fourth, what 
we are presenting here is to be understood as a two-way street rather than a set of top-down 
influences. To quote Neilson et al. (2014: DJDLQµ*9&V*31VLPSDFWUHFXUVLYHO\ZLWKLQWKHDUHQDV
LQZKLFKWKH\DUHFRQQHFWHG¶DQGWKLVPLJKWLQFOXGHDQ\WKLQJIURPSUHVVXUHRQWKHVWDWHWROLEHUDOLze 
wage policies or to enhance research and training infrastructures. In sum, if these four points are taken 
into consideration when considering second order questions about governance and asset specificity 
within dyads, or any other interactions within a chain segment, better explanations of chain dynamics 
are possible7KDWLVQRWWRVD\WKDWWKHµCs¶DUHsimply left intact. Conceptualizations of power and 
value need to be strengthened, and, pertinent to this chapter, a stronger sense of labour characteristics 
needs to be folded into categories such as supplier capability and codification. Whether the existing 
five governance typology is sustainable or will need modification is a question that can be left open to 
further research and theory building. 
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In this short explanation of the diagram, little mention has been made of labour because the rest of the 
chapter explores that dimension. 
 
The Labour Problem(atic) 
We have already noted the omission or marginalization of labour in GVC analysis. The partial and 
more recent exception focuses on upgrading, particularly in WKHFRQWH[WRIWKHµ&DSturing the Gains 
project¶ (http://www.capturingthegains.org/). Any attention paid to labour issues is welcome and 
such interventions are normatively linked to a decent work agenda associated with the International 
Labour Organisation  and other global bodies. However, these tend to be questions framed by an 
economic development agenda that is not necessarily coextensive with a labour focus per se. 
Furthermore, there is a naivety in some of the assumptions that µPRYLQJDORQJ WKHYDOXHFKDLQ¶DQG
ensuring greater value capture is necessarily or predominantly associated with favourable outcomes 
for labour through various types of upgrading and higher skill content of jobs. 
Whatever the merits or otherwise of this approach, it is in GPN debates that one finds a more 
appropriate starting point for a more detailed examination of the labour problematic. As Coe and 
Jordhus-Lier (2011) note in their excellent overview, much of that debate has been initiated and 
sustained by lDERXUJHRJUDSKHUVZLWKPDQ\HVSHFLDOO\LQWKHILUVWSKDVHGHWHUPLQHGWRµFHOHEUDWHWKH
DJHQF\RIODERXU¶DQGLGHQWLI\IRUPVRI µKH\GD\V¶DQG collective resistance. Two papers in the GPN 
and labour debate (Cumbers et al., 2008; Selwyn, 2011) are particularly pertinent as they have some 
engagement with labour process themes. Cumbers et al. (2008: 371) argue that traditional 
(GVC/GPN) approaches are capital- and state-centric. Both papers want to go further than inserting 
labour as an additional actor. Selwyn argues for seeing labour as having a co-constitutive role in 
capitalist development. Drawing on autonomist Marxism, Cumbers et al. go further, placing labour 
agency, exploitation and class conflict at the centre of GPN dynamics. Though formulating their 
positions on agency in slightly different ways, both papers suggest that there are two dimensions to 
the way that the labour problem inserts itself into the logic of accumulation. On the one hand, there is 
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the way in which abstract labour or labour power is mobilized, controlled and organized to produce 
the surplus. On the other are attempts by labour to leverage its positionality within relevant 
chains/networks to increase its share of the surplus. Setting aside the assumption ± deriving from the 
labour theory of value ± that abstract labour is the sole source of the surplus, this leads to a useful 
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQODERXUSRZHUDQGODERXU¶VSRZHU 
What is more contentious are the imputed connections between the processes. Labour power, agency 
and resistance are placed at the centre of capital accumulation. This is expressed in different ways in 
the two papers. For Selwyn (2011), labour regimes are the defining feature of GPNs and stretch from 
the workplace to commodity specialism and the whole sphere of social reproduction. Cumbers et al. 
PHDQZKLOHDUJXHWKDWµFDSLWDOLVYLHZHGDVUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHSUREOHPRIODERXUFRQWURO¶
DQG LVDOZD\V µLQ IOLJKW IURP ODERXU¶ UHVSRQGLQJ WR WKHSUREOHPRIYDOXHH[WUDFWLRQ IURP ODERXU LQ
production. It might seem odd for us to argue that LPT puts or should put less emphasis on labour or 
at least labour control, but a brief re-cap of some theoretical context might help. Second wave LPT 
was built around control and resistance models, so such emphases have clear echoes. However, 
mainstream LPT tends not to make such expansive claims about labour regimes. Following the notion 
of the relative autonomy of the labour process (Edwards, 1990), most researchers focus on the role of 
labour agency and capital-labour dynamics as a key driver of workplace social relations, avoiding any 
necessary connection to issues concerning the reproduction of capitalism as a whole. To make our 
critique of the positions in the two papers clear, focusing on exploitation and control of labour as the 
defining feature of capitalist development repeats a mistake made in earlier debates concerning the 
need to understand the role of the full circuit of capital in regimes of accumulation. In other words, 
whilst labour control is an integral feature of the transformation of labour power into profitable 
labour, it would be a mistake to define GPNs or GVCs solely or primarily as labour control regimes. 
One danger is that analyses move from being firm-centric to firms (and capital) being largely absent. 
As Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011: 221) note, µ$IXQGDmental starting point for a reassessment of labour 
agency has to be the changing nature and scale of the organisation of capitaO¶ 
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There is a second problem concerning labour agency. Despite complaining that such agency is often 
conflated with trade unions as collective actors (Cumbers et al., 2008: 371), union strategies in the 
global economy is the empirical focus of that paper. Selwyn (2011: 18), similarly, utilizes a broader 
IUDPH WKDW LV FRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH µH[SHULHQFHV RI ZRUNLQJ FODVV IRUPDWLRQ LQ ]RQHV RI FRPPRGLW\
SURGXFWLRQ¶ 7KHUH LV QRWKLQJ ZURQJ ZLWK IRFXVLQJ HPSLULFDOO\ RQ VXFK PDWWHUV EXW LW PD\ QRW EH
relevant to issues of labour agency in many workplaces. Researchers within a labour process and 
radical political economy tradition need to allow for the fact that µpositionality in relation to processes 
RIYDOXHFDSWXUH¶&XPEHUVHWDO., 2008: 373) may give little or no leverage to labour as a collective, 
organized actor, or that workers may choose not to exercise leverage collectively. Or to put it in 
6HOZ\Q¶VIDYRXUHGWHUPLQRORJ\, structural power at work may be associated with weak associational 
power. 
In the absence of collective mobilization, that may mean that a local story in parts of a chain/network 
may be about impacts on labour. That does not mean that labour agency is irrelevant or marginal in 
struggles over value. LPT is premised on the indeterminacy of labour. Labour power is always both 
acted on and active in that struggle In general, however, there is a need to be clearer about what 
explanatory problem inserting labour is seeking to solve. We would distinguish between three 
categories: inputs, impact and agency. Labour may not often co-determine GVC/GPN dynamics, but 
labour power (cost and characteristics) is a significant input in decisions on sourcing and location, and 
issues of skill utilization, control and work intensity are central to value capture and distribution. Such 
processes overlap into the sphere of impacts. GVC analyses in particular need to do more to show 
how the division of labour along value chains and changes in work flows impact on employment 
UHODWLRQV DQG ZRUN SUDFWLFHV¶ Flecker et al., 2013). Contrary to the largely optimistic upgrading 
narrative, work externalization, subcontracting and other processes frequently lead to deteriorating 
work conditions at the base of the chain (Palpaceur, 2008: 401±405). Nor is it confined to that end. 
Flecker and Meil (2010: 694±695) demonstrate how even in industries such as software development, 
upgrading in service providers may lead to restructuring and job insecurity in the core firm. 
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With respect to agency, it is important that discussion does not simply become another territory to re-
run mobilization and/or resistance debates. Whilst there is of course scope to apply concepts such as 
resistance, reworking and resilience to agency in chains and networks (see Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 
2011: 216±218; Coe, 2013), a more concrete approach would draw on the relations between structural 
and associational power adapted by Selwyn (2011) from Erik Olin Wright. A framework of this sort 
has been recently outlined by Lakhani et al. (2013). ExtendLQJ WKH µFRQILJXUDWLRQDO¶ DSSURDFK
embodied in Gereffi et al.¶V¶ JRYHUQDQFH W\SRORJ\ WKH DXWKRUV µDUJXH WKDW HPSOR\PHQW UHODWLRQV
systems in GVCs need to be assessed on the basis of their specific configurations of firm 
interdependencies, task complexitieV DQG VXSSOLHU FDSDELOLWLHV¶  7KH\ JR RQ WR GHYHORS
employment system propositions allied to the five governance types. Such an approach has the 
definite advantage of integrating labour issues more closely into the 3Cs ± complexity, codifiability 
and competence. +RZHYHULWDOVRVXIIHUVIURPWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRILWVµSDUHQW¶'HVSLWHVRPHUHIHUHQFH
WR HPSOR\PHQW UHODWLRQV DFURVV FKDLQV WKH IRFXV UHPDLQV RQ µFRRUGLQDWLRQ EHWZHHQ WZR OLQNV RU
ILUPV LQ D FKDLQ¶  7KH SURSRVHG PLFUR-level configurations therefore suffer from the same 
problem ± the bigger picture is bracketed off. As a result employment relations outcomes tend to be 
read-off from the dyadic relationship ± for example, the assumption that (relational) chains that 
involve complex tasks performed by skilled workers are likely to offer stable employment. The 
problem with this assumption is that employment stability is not primarily a property of the dyadic 
relationship, as we shall see in the next section. The larger industry and political economy contexts 
matter, and with this in mind, the final substantive section below returns to the two industries ± VFX 
and games ± to make some first and second order observations about labour. 
Making the Link in High-Tech Creative Industries 
We examine these issues further in the context of research into two digital content based 
entertainment industries ± visual effects for films, and games for both consoles and mobile devices. In 
both industries, data was gathered primarily through over 80 semi-structured interviews in two stages. 
In the first stage, interviews with firm owners were wide ranging and covered the range of issues 
necessary to identify key dynamics of the industry associated with financing, design, production and 
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distribution and how these dynamics were affected by the structure of the global industry and 
international market developments. The interviews with employees/developers were also wide 
ranging and focused on the nature of work and employment within the industry as well as the nature 
of the labour process, covering hours of work, conditions of employment, levels of autonomy and 
how these were affected by the nature of the industry context as described in the first round of 
interviews. 
Visual effects and games are now massive global industries. Digital entertainment is a particularly 
DSSURSULDWHVHFWRUIRU*9&DQDO\VLV7KHWDVNFRPSRQHQWVRIVXFKµLPPDWHULDO¶FRPPRGLWLHVFDQEH
allocated on a truly global basis, even to the margins. For example, with spiralling game development 
costs, increased competition and pressure to speed up the development cycle, publishers are taking 
advantage of digitalized technologies to (out)source work to an increasingly spatially dispersed 
µQHWZRUN¶RIGHYHORSHUV$VDFRQVHTXHQFHZHFDQREVHUYHQRWRQO\vertical but virtual integration of 
ownership and activities. Within these processes, conglomerate corporations form part of a shared 
HFRORJ\ ZLWK µ60(V FRQQHFWHG WKURXJK D P\ULDG RI KRUL]RQWDO UHODWLRQVKLSV LQ VSHFLILF ORFDWLRQV¶
(Fitzgerald, 2014: 1). 
Gereffi et al. DUJXHWKDWWKHFRQFHSWRIDµUHODWLRQDOYDOXHFKDLQ¶EHVWGHVFULEHVWKHJRYHUQDQFH
models of global value chains in industries in which there is 1) an exchange of complex information 
that cannot be codified and therefore relies on factors such as reputation and trust-building; 2) 
transactions are complex; and, 3) supplier capabilities are high. On the surface this mirrors the 
characteristics of the VFX industry, which involves the provision of a service which is difficult to 
specify in advance, depends on ongoing communication and negotiation between the service provider 
and customer throughout the process of service provision, and in which the creative and technical 
capabilities of service providers and their employees are high. Furthermore, these capabilities are 
difficult to replicate in that they depend on prior experience in completing projects within the very 
limited Hollywood market and the time-consuming development of relationships with Hollywood 
producers. As with the VFX industry, the console games industry is characterized by repeated 
information exchange between developers and publishers/console manufacturers throughout the 
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development process, and repeat business (rather than arms-length transactions) is the norm (Johns, 
2006; Kerr, 2006). 
Despite the appearance of a relational value chain with implied horizontal networks and dispersed 
power and opportunities for value capture, both industries demonstrate features of concentration and 
bottleneck (Jacobides et al., 2006; Parker et al., 2014). For example, the power of Hollywood studios 
is extensive at all points of the value chain from writing to distribution. Within the global film value 
chain, the production sector, of which VFX is a part, remains relatively independent from these media 
conglomerates in the sense that there are a large number of semi-independent production companies, 
although these companies remain dependent on the media conglomerates for finance and distribution 
(Coe and Johns, 2004). Australian VFX firms operating in the Hollywood global film production 
network are required to form close relations with Hollywood VFX supervisors and producers in order 
to facilitate complex information exchange regarding the nature of the VFX images and services. 
However, their relational interactions are moderated by the bottleneck position of Hollywood media 
conglomerates and therefore characterized by unequal power relations. As such, VFX firms struggle 
to capture value in these negotiations. 
In the games industry, the console manufacturers and games publishers are positioned in the central 
regional locations of the USA, Japan and Europe and clearly dominate the industry. There is a trend in 
industry concentration amongst publishers who play an important role in connecting games 
developers to global markets (Johns, 2006; Kerr, 2006; Martin and Deuze, 2009). Games developers 
create software titles that are played on specific console platforms. There is a complex competition for 
value capture between console manufacturers, publishers, development studios and retailers. 
Development studios are both the creative core and the weakest link in the chain, relatively isolated in 
terms of network connectivity and largely dependent on publishers for finance. Publishers, sometimes 
collaborating or overlapping in ownership with console manufacturers, are the fulcrum of power. This 
power is focused on market concentration, control of intellectual property rights, access to finance, 
transfer of risk and greater mobility/switching capacity. Industry concentration increased from the 
1990s as game production costs escalated and firms sought economies of scale through acquisitions of 
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successful independent developers. The dominant business model for Australian firms has 
traditionally been as second-party developers and working on licensed products. 
After a period of significant expansion and maturation, the industry restructured and underwent a 
shake-out in the context of the global financial crash (GFC). This led to many closures and further 
concentration, with a smaller number of mid-sized firms servicing the console market and a new array 
of micro firms entering the casual gaming segment. This segment in principle offered up possibilities 
of different governance dynamics in the value chain, given lowered barriers to entry, formal 
independence during the development process and a move towards transactional, arms-length 
relations. However a different basis for unequal bargaining power has emerged. The gatekeeper role 
of publishers has shifted but remains as quality controller. Lead firms (notably Apple and Google) are 
setting standards designed to make it hard for developers to switch between platforms, maintaining 
their bottleneck position that lock developers in to particular devices. Lead firms benefit from a 
combination of limited competition within the segment and intense competition amongst suppliers 
(Parker et al., 2014). 
,QGLJLWDOHQWHUWDLQPHQWWKHUHDUHYDOXHFDSWXUHRSWLRQVDYDLODEOH8SJUDGLQJPLJKWLQYROYHµmoving 
LQWRFRQWHQW¶ WKURXJKYDULRXVPHDQVRIFDSWXULQJ LQWHOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\ ULJKWV IRU H[DPSOH LQD ILOP
SURMHFW 7KLV ZRXOG QRUPDOO\ LQYROYH VRPH YHUVLRQ RI µJRLQJ JOREDO¶ 6XFFHVVIXO $XVWUDOLDQ 9);
firms such as Animal Logic have committed significant resources to developing and maintaining 
relationships with critical Hollywood decision makers, including establishing offices in Los Angeles. 
This would be consistent with relational value chains in which reputational networks depend, in part, 
on close, face-to-face, repeated interactions between the key players. However, this path is a distinctly 
PLQRULW\RQHRQO\DYDLODEOHWRWKHµELJER\V¶ZKRKDYHFORVHQHWZRUNVZLWKWKH6WXGLRVDQGDWUDFN
record delivering on large VFX projects. For the vast majority of development studios reputation is 
established primarily through market considerations associated with quality and cost and this is a very 
unequal struggle. These are professional service firms whose costing structure normally involves a 
fixed fee, whereby the risk lies with them rather than the buyer if work is unable to be completed 
within budget. A major issue for the service firm is how to cost variations which the director or 
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producer often request when they are not happy with the product as projecWV XQIROG µ,QWDQJLEOH
VHUYLFH GHOLYHU\¶ PD\ EH UHODWLRQDO EXW WKRVH UHODWLRQV DUH VXIILFLHQWO\ KLHUDUFKLFDO WR SODFH PDMRU
constraints on capturing the value they create in films and games. 
Labour in Digital Entertainment 
Development studios in both industries are the creative core, but they are also the weak link in the 
struggle for value capture between the major actors. A fundamental issue is one of risk and its 
transfer. Though referring to a broader set of cultural commodities in audio-visual industries, 
Fitzgerald (2014) confirms the point in the observation that the majority of the costs and risks of 
production are borne by a myriad of relatively smaller, flexible and therefore often expendable firms. 
The core of this dynamic arises from the fact that supplier firms are constantly pitching for new work 
and trying to build reputation and trust with buyers. Yet VFX and games are characterized by a high 
degree of uncertainty regarding how the potential product will evolve during the course of 
development and therefore on the process of managing contract variation. This puts a premium on 
processes such as budgeting and time scheduling. Yet, what has often been neglected is the ways in 
which those issues of costs and risks are reflected and reproduced in the management of work and 
employment relations in the supplier firms. So, for example, where developments studios are paid a 
fixed sum in a negotiated production contract with periodic advances throughout the development 
process, under-pricing and over-promising are persistent problems that shape contract variation. As a 
result, a portion of that risk is transferred to labour, given that creative labour power ± high quality 
work at lower and controlled costs ± is predominantly what the firm is selling to the corporate buyer. 
In other words, we have to recognize the links between winning work and constraints on labour at 
work. 
Interviews with employees in development studios reveal that the uneven power struggle between 
firms in the value chain and the subsequent cost pressures have significant effects on and in the 
workflow. These take three main forms. First, there are tightened controls. Complex tasks cannot be 
cannot be micro-managed, but within the delivery of projects oversight and direction can be 
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strengthened. Respondents in both industries referred to what might be termed a system of dual 
control, whereby the firm manages relations with the client or its agent (for example an independent 
VFX supervisor acting on behalf of a Hollywood major) and exerts greater control over quality and 
costs within the project teams. This is typically expressed in the form of mini-hierarchies within 
functional groups (e.g. compositors, coders, artists) led by directors or overall supervisors. Employees 
made frequent reference to greater accountability to and interference by external agents, with the 
SLSHOLQHRUZRUNIORZ LQFUHDVLQJO\ VWUXFWXUHGDFFRUGLQJ WR µPLOHVWRQHV¶DQGRUJDQLzed through what 
RQH HPSOR\HH GHVFULEHG DV D µVWULFWO\ KLHUDUFKLFDO VWUXFWXUH¶ Such trends are confirmed in other 
studies; Deuze et al. (2009: 350) refer to µWLJKWHUVXSHUYLVRU\SURFHGXUHV¶ DQGµPXOWLSOHPLOHVWRQHV¶< 
Second, there is enhanced specialization. Within firms, there are still generalists as well as specialists, 
but with added complexity and the need for speed and reliability comes pressures to divide tasks and 
streamline the sequencing  
,W¶VGHILQLWHO\JRWPRUHVSHFLDOLzed. In the past you needed to have a broader skill set «%XW
now there is literally a person for everything «DQG\RXFDQMXVWIRFXVRQ\RXUQLFKHDQGMXVW
improve your skill set in that area, just to be more productive. (VFX employee) 
Third, there is the squeezing of additional effort from the collective creative process. Work intensity 
has traditionally been temporally uneven with that squeeze focused on extra hours and effort during 
µFUXQFKWLPH¶DW WKHHQGRISURMHFWVThis still continues in some companies and projects, but many 
respondents also reported faster work pace and pressure to µGRPRUHZLWKOHVV¶James employee) and 
DFFRPSOLVK µa lot more work in the same, if not leVV WLPH¶ 9); Hmployee). The link to power 
asymmetry and contract variation is made clear in this observation from a VFX employee in a 
different firm: µ6RWKHUH¶VDFRQVWDQWbattle going on when companies just try to get jobs for less pay 
in total, which again forces them to deliver more work in less period of time and with less people¶. 
What do these trends mean for categories outlined in the previous session? Labour power issues are 
connected to the input and impact dimensions. The latter has been outlined through the triple trends 
just discussed. In terms of input, we have not dealt with the availability of qualified labour and its 
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relationship with locational and sourcing issues. Our focus has been the centrality of labour power 
characteristics WRµVXSSOLHUFRPSHWHQFH¶, to managerial intervention in the labour process and to the 
DELOLW\RIGHYHORSPHQWVWXGLRVWRGHOLYHURQWKHLUµUHODWLRQDO¶H[FKDQJHVZLWKOHDGILUPV that occupy a 
dominant or bottleneck position in the chain. One of the outcomes of this particular dynamic is a 
certain degree of standardization and specialization, or what Flecker et al. (2013: 14) refer to as a 
tension between the µcirculation and codification of knowledge¶. 
As for labour¶s power and agency issues, games and VFX workers have traditionally occupied a 
relatively advantageous structural position so that associational power was largely unnecessary. In the 
early growth stages of both industries, a mainly young, internationally mobile and male talent pool 
was able to leverage expertise and mobility to access high tech, high status employment. Traditionally 
that mobile labour force was able to utilize exit to other firms and technology intensive sectors rather 
than voice. However, a combination of the global financial crisis and the concentration of power in 
the two chains has led to greater instability and insecurity. We undertook our interviews in games 
firms after the financial crisis, which led to a significant shake-out in the industry, involving tighter 
budgets, shrunken workforces and disappearing or downsized firms. Our interviews revealed a clear 
trend of weakening work and industry attachments, if not organized opposition. Our interviews with 
VFX workers were undertaken prior to the equivalent restructuring and shake-out, so industry 
attachments were still relatively strong. Yet there have been subsequent rumblings of discontent and 
collective action as conditions worsen (for example see http://vfxsolidarity.org/; 
http://vfxtippingpoint.blogspot.co.uk/ ). 
<H1>Conclusions</H1> 
Whilst we agree with Bair (2008) and Taylor (2010) that there is value in GCC, GPN and GVC 
frameworks, and that their usefulness will depend on which scalar level or theoretical issue is being 
addressed, we have chosen to explore relations between modified GPN categories and LPT. The main 
reason is that in moving away from workplace-centric orientations, LPT has needed conceptual and 
methodological tools at a meso-level more than it has needed to become part of an all-encompassing 
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theory-building project (that GPN has a tendency towards). In our review of the GVC framework and 
its application to digital entertainment, we have been very critical of the limitations of its conceptual 
categories. As we indicated earlier, using the Gereffi et al. framework, these industries should 
resemble relational governanceEXWWKH\GRQ¶W,QRXUYLHZWKLV is a conceptual rather than a category 
error and one that cannot be rectified by reclassifying the governance dynamics found in these chains 
as modular or captive. However, we remain open to further exploration of whether a revised, multi-
level approach offers a way forward. Our contribution to that offers a preliminary heuristic that adds 
DQH[SODQDWRU\OD\HUIRFXVLQJRQDµKLJKHU¶OHYHORIµJRYHUQDQFH¶WKDWZRXOGFRPSHOLQYHVWLJDWLRQVRI
chain dynamics (dyadic or otherwise) to consider core questions on capital, state and labour 
influences and interactions. 
Implicit in the above is a contribution to the development of LPT and its capacity to engage in 
industry level analysis at a global(izing) level. Part of that reorientation is situating LPT more clearly 
as part of the µIDPLO\¶RIUDGLFDOSROLWLFDOHFRQRP\DSSURDFKHVDVZHOODVDPDLQVWD\RIWKHVRFLRORJ\
of work. Part of what LPT brings to the political economy table is an extensive track record of 
research and concept development on labour issues. Bringing insights from that tradition to bear on 
the burgeoning debate on labour and GVC/GPN is a further contribution, in this case utilizing more 
careful distinctions between what labour issues are being inserted ± inputs, impacts and agency. 
Again, it remains to be seen the extent to which labour can be successfully integrated into GVC 
governance categories. 
Finally, drawing from more detailed examinations elsewhere (Parker et al., 2014), we have sought to 
make a contribution to understanding particular value chains in digital entertainment industries. VFX 
and games are particularly useful in offsetting the developmental/upgrading bias in much of the 
historical and contemporary literatures. The production of these digitalized commodities can be 
sourced anywhere that capabilities exist, and the buyer-supplier relations are almost wholly in 
µDGYDQFHG¶ SRVW-industrial economies. In particular it is valuable to have accounts of value capture 
DQG VRPHWLPHV ZRUVHQLQJ FRQGLWLRQV RI ODERXU µXS WKH FKDLQ¶ 7KH SLFWXUH LV QHFHVVDULO\ partial 
given that the focus is on specific chain segments. For example, we concentrated here mainly on 
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console games rather than casual games for smartphones (see Parker et al., 2014). If the value chain 
of, say, the iPhone is the focus, a quite different picture of value and labour emerges. As Clelland 
(2014) shows, whilst the monopolistic bottleneck position of Apple and its ability to capture the 
majority of the surplus is similar to its equivalent in games, the underpaid or unpaid labour of workers 
in Asia would be the focal point of labour analysis. This reinforces the general lesson: that meso-level 
frameworks privilege grounded industry level analysis that can more effectively link macro (CPE) and 
micro (workplace) relations. 
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